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Property Rights, Land Conflict and Tenancy in Brazil

Alston, Lee J.; Mueller, Bernardo - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010

Tenancy has been a means for labor to advance their socio-economic condition in agriculture yet in Brazil and Latin America, tenancy rates are low compared to the U.S. and the OECD countries. We test for the importance of insecure property rights in Brazil on the reluctance of landowners to rent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631684

Modeling Inefficient Institutions

Acemoglu, Daron - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

Why do inefficient %uF818 non-growth enhancing %uF818 institutions emerge and persist? This paper develops a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036822

Coercion, Culture and Debt Contracts: The Henequen Industry in Yucatan, Mexico, 1870-1915

Alston, Lee J.; Mattiace, Shannan; Nonnenmacher, Tomas - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008

While most contemporary historians agree that the use of debt peonage as a coercive labor contract in Mexico was not widespread, scholars still concur that it was important and pervasive in Yucatan state during the henequen boom of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The henequen boom...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005830180

Rainfall Forecasts, Weather and Wages over the Agricultural Production Cycle

Rosenzweig, Mark; Udry, Christopher - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014

We look at the effects of rainfall forecasts and realized rainfall on equilibrium agricultural wages over the course of the agricultural production cycle. We show theoretically that a forecast of good weather can lower wages in the planting stage, by lowering ex ante out-migration, and can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821686

Productivity Response to a Contract Change

Ray, Debraj; Jayaraman, Rajshri; Vericourt, Francis de - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014

This paper studies the productivity impact of a contract change for tea pluckers in an Indian plantation. The contract, implemented at the end of a three-year cycle in which contracts are generally revised, was (a) the joint outcome of negotiations between twenty unions and plantations, (b)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950695

A Theory of Military Dictatorships

Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008

We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. Nondemocratic regimes need the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005778779

A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History

Weingast, Barry R.; North, Douglass C; Wallis, John Joseph - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

Neither economics nor political science can explain the process of modern social development. The fact that developed … must be a fundamental part of the development process. This paper develops an integrated theory of economics and politics … key to understanding modern social development is understanding the transition from limited to open access social orders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714272

Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James Alan - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005050043

Persistence of Civil Wars

Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622352

The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Investigation of the Settler Mortality Data

Albouy, David Y. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008

In a seminal contribution, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argue property-rights institutions powerfully affect national income, using estimated mortality rates of early European settlers to instrument capital expropriation risk. However 36 of the 64 countries in their sample are assigned...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720595