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spiller, pablo t. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011

This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a …. TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics … possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804668

Cultures of Corruption: Evidence From Diplomatic Parking Tickets

Miguel, Edward Andrew; Fisman, Raymond - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of legal enforcement versus cultural norms in controlling corruption is poorly understood. To disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural experiment, the stationing of thousands of diplomats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720647

Antitrust and Regulation

Carlton, Dennis W.; Picker, Randal C. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have … antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign … record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774722

Evaluating the Effectiveness of National Labor Relations Act Remedies: Analysis and Comparison with Other Workplace Penalty Policies

Kleiner, Morris M.; Weil, David - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010

The goal of this paper is to examine the implied penalty policies underlying the remedies created by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in terms of the policies' impact on employer and union behaviors. We present a simple model of deterrence as a means of evaluating workplace penalty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764664

The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia

Olken, Benjamin; Banerjee, Abhijit; Hanna, Rema; Kyle, … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2015

Can governments improve aid programs by providing information to beneficiaries? In our model, information can change how much aid citizens receive as they bargain with local officials who implement national programs. In a large-scale field experiment, we test whether mailing cards with program...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165140

Market-based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy

DellaVigna, Stefano; Knight, Brian G.; La Ferrara, Eliana; … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

favorable regulation in return. We investigate this channel in Italy where government members, including the prime minister, are … estimate one billion euros of extra revenue to Berlusconi's group. We also estimate the expected returns in regulation to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821836

Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia

Olken, Benjamin; Alatas, Vivi; Banerjee, Abhijit; … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

This paper investigates the impact of elite capture on the allocation of targeted government welfare programs in Indonesia, using both a high-stakes field experiment that varied the extent of elite influence and non-experimental data on a variety of existing government transfer programs....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796586

Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam

Jayachandran, Seema; Olken, Benjamin; Bai, Jie; … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

Government corruption is more prevalent in poor countries than in rich countries. This paper uses cross-industry heterogeneity in growth rates within Vietnam to test empirically whether growth leads to lower corruption. We find that it does. We begin by developing a model of government...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796606

The Gradients of Power: Evidence from the Chinese Housing Market

Fang, Hanming; Zhou, Li-An; Gu, Quanlin - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014

Using a large, unique dataset on the Chinese housing market, we propose to measure corruption using the price differences paid by bureaucrat buyers and non-bureaucrat buyers in the housing market. We find that the housing price paid by bureaucrat buyers is on average 1.05 percentage points lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010798421

Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

Chassang, Sylvain; Miquel, Gerard Padró i - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014

We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969268