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Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing

Facchini, Giovanni - 2005

Structurally estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model using coverage ratios that include non-tariff barriers leads to biased parameter estimates. We develop a "protection for sale" theoretical framework consistent with the data, by explicitly allowing for non-tariff barriers. Introducing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467416

Lobbies and Technology Diffusion

Comin, Diego - 2005

This paper explores whether lobbies slow down technology diffusion. To answer this question, we exploit the differential effect of various institutional attributes that should affect the costs of erecting barriers when the new technology has a technologically close predecessor but not otherwise....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467665

Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause

Bagwell, Kyle - 2004

We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467700

Political Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation : Theory and Evidence

Drazen, Allan - 2004

contribution a lobby can make improves its bargaining position relative to the politician, thus increasing the payoff from lobbying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467759

Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting

Krishna, Pravin - 2004

This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria -...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467863

Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy : An Interest-Group Approach

Krishna, Pravin - 2003

Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner's trade policies. We find that such unilateral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469067

The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups : Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

de Figueiredo, John M. - 2002

litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking … cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the … quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, 2) as interest groups become …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469733

Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying : Why Governments Pick Losers

Baldwin, Richard E. - 2002

sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by … pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industry, entry tends to erode such rents, but in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469959

Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining

Celik, Levent - 2011

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461395

Special Interests and the Media : Theory and an Application to Climate Change

Shapiro, Jesse M. - 2014

A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests' claims to the voter. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458856