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Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule : A Model of Personal Rule

Acemoglu, Daron - 2003

Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats', who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in part,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468558

The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets : Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

Scharfstein, David S. - 1997

We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. In an effort to stop rent-seeking, corporate headquarters will be effectively forced into paying bribes to some division managers. And because...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472852

Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing : a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

Chassang, Sylvain - 2014

possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458351

Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption : A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device

Tella, Rafael Di - 2007

There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered investigating levels of consumption that appear … the principal. We argue that this assumption has to be revised in applications that study corruption. The informativeness … consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications. We show that when there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465490

Executive Compensation : A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457535

Horizontal and Vertical Conflict : Experimental Evidence

Galiani, Sebastian - 2016

Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world's societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456815

Vertical Integration, Institutional Determinants and Impact : Evidence from China

Fan, Joseph P.H. - 2009

transaction difficulties. But, such environments often also feature highly interventionist government, and even corruption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463999

Corruption, Inequality and Fairness

Alesina, Alberto - 2005

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for … redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a … simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467282

Discouraging Rivals : Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies

Stiglitz, Joseph E. - 1992

We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474825

Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation : The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile

MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2016

a way to integrate Williamson's (1975) notion of guile into agency theory. We find that designing sales contracts for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456519