We evaluate the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on monetary policy over the 1960 - 2000 period. We document the introduction of monetarism, rational expectations, credibility, transparency, and other monetary policy...

We evaluate the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on banking policy in the 1950s and 1960s. We document that demand for research and analysis was driven by banking industry developments and legal changes that required the...

The decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System is evaluated as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on monetary and financial policy. The role of the Reserve Banks starting in the 1960s is emphasized. The introduction of monetarism in the 1960s, rational expectations in...

We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model distinguishing supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relation between...

We show how bundling, exclusivity and additional markets internalize fire sale and other pecuniary externalities. Ex ante competition can achieve a constrained efficient allocation. The solution can be put rather simply: create segregated market exchanges which specify prices in advance and...

We develop a micro-founded general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and three dimensions of financial inclusion: access (determined by a participation cost), depth (determined by a borrowing constraint), and intermediation efficiency (determined by a monitoring cost). We find that the...

Pecuniary externalities have regained the interest of researchers as they seek policy interventions and regulations to remedy externality-induced distortions, e.g., balance sheet effects, amplifiers and fire sales. In this paper we go back to first principles and show how to design financial...

This paper studies a competitive general equilibrium model with default and endogenous collateralized contracts. The possibility of trade in spot markets creates externalities, as spot prices and the bindingness of collateral constraints interact. We propose a market based solution which...

We use a variety of different data sets from Thailand to study not only the extremes of micro and macro variables but also within-country flow of funds and labor migration. We develop a general equilibrium model that encompasses regional variation in the type of financial friction and calibrate...

We formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of constrained credit/insurance that allow for moral hazard and limited commitment. We compare them to full insurance and exogenously incomplete financial regimes (autarky, saving only, borrowing and lending in a single asset). We develop...