We study a Lucas asset pricing model that is standard in all respects representative agent's subjective beliefs about endowment growth are distorted. Using constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility a CRRA coefficient below ten that exhibit, on average, excessive pessimism over expansions...

This paper investigates the ability of a representative agent model with time separable utility to explain the mean vector and the covariance matrix of the risk free interest rate and the return to leveraged equity in the stock market. The paper generalizes the standard calibration methodology...

Recent empirical studies have found that stock returns contain substantial negative serial correlation at long horizons. We examine this finding with a series of Monte Carlo simulations in order to demonstrate that it is consistent with an equilibrium model of asset pricing. When investors...

In this paper we explore the conjecture that the periodic episodes of high prices and constrained supply in the property- casualty industry are the result of temporary capital shortages. We do this by looking for increases in activities aimed at increasing capital at these times: dividend cuts,...

We examine asset prices and consumption patterns in a model in which agents face both aggregate and idiosyncratic income shocks, and insurance markets are incomplete. Agents reduce consumption variability by trading in a stock and bond market to offset idiosyncratic shocks, but transactions...

Early cash-in-advance models have the feature that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds, implying that the velocity of money is constant. Lucas (1984) and Svensson (1985) propose a change in information structure that potentially allows velocity to vary. By calibrating a version of these...

This paper develops a formal model of the timing and pricing of new equity issues, assuming that managers are better informed than new investors about the quality of the firm. Firms will prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the quality of the firm. This implies that...

Banks know more about the quality of their assets than do outside investors. This informational asymmetry can distort investment decisions if the bank must raise funds from uninformed outsiders, and assets sold will be subject to a lemons discount. Using a three-period equilibrium model we...

This paper models bank asset choice when shareholders know more about loan quality than do outsiders. Because of this informational asymmetry, the price of loans in the secondary market is the price for poor quality loans. Banks desire to hold marketable securities in order to avoid liquidating...