Similar Search Results

A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection

Netzer, Nick - 2012

We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012460190

A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

Green, Jerry R. - 1982

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012478271

Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments

Brown, Jennifer - 2011

We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012461018

Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives : Evidence from a Tournament

Freeman, Richard B. - 2006

This paper examines performance in a tournament setting with different levels of inequality in rewards and different provision of information about individual's skill at the task prior to the tournament. We find that that total tournament output depends on inequality according to an inverse U...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012466074

Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism : Theory and Evidence from China

Fang, Hanming; Li, Ming; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

We argue that inter-jurisdictional competition in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local … presence of regional spillover and the incentive for political competition leads to biased resource allocations against the … political competition, they allocate less government procurement contracts to firms in the competing city; second, local firms …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013477272

Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty

Burger, Nicholas E. - 2009

coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the … emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition … coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012463106

Coalition Formation in Political Games

Acemoglu, Daron - 2006

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of … political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of … resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012465911

Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives

Anton, Miguel; Ederer, Florian; Giné, Mireia; Schmalz, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013477278

Equilibrium Conditions for Catch-22 Situations

Gans, Joshua - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024

This is a paper in the ``economists ruin everything'' field. It considers whether Catch-22 situations can persist as an equilibrium phenomenon. Rather than being an arbitrary rule or a set of self-serving beliefs, the focus is on the preferences of Gatekeepers who choose to create such...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015171705

Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests

Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014247957