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Banks are optimally opaque institutions. They produce debt for use as a transaction medium (bank money), which requires that information about the backing assets - loans - not be revealed, so that bank money does not fluctuate in value, reducing the efficiency of trade. This need for opacity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458411
the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers' credit quality. The relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458184
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk averse agent would like to borrow from a risk neutral lender to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464753
This study examines the influence of institutional environment on capital structure and debt maturity choices by examining a cross-section of firms in 39 developed and developing countries. We find that a country's legal and tax system, the level of corruption and the preferences of capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462212
Publicly-traded debt securities differ on a number of dimensions, including quality, maturity, seniority, security, and convertibility. Finance research has provided a number of theories as to why firms should issue debt with different features; yet, there is very little empirical work testing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464940
We analyze data on tens of thousands of alternating-offer, business-to-business negotiations in the wholesale used … mediating the negotiations. We find that who intermediates the negotiation matters: high-performing mediators are 22.03% more … negotiations, overcoming some of the inefficiency inherent in incomplete-information settings …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616607
We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection. Principals (e.g. employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms. Agents (e.g. workers, or asset holders)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463733
This paper studies contracting between a principal and multiple agents. The setup is classical except for the assumption that agents have interdependent preferences. We characterize cost effective contracts, and relate the direction of co-movement in rewards -- "joint liability" (positive) or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512144
During contractual negotiations, parties often make (reliance) expenditures that would increase the surplus should a … parties' decisions to enter into contractual negotiations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470489
We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away. In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465641