We develop a tractable incomplete-markets model with an earnings process Y subject to permanent shocks and borrowing constraints. Financial frictions cause the marginal (certainty equivalent) value of wealth W to be greater than unity and decrease with liquidity w = W/Y . Additionally, financial...

We develop an incomplete-markets q-theoretic model to study entrepreneurship dynamics. Precautionary motive, borrowing constraints, and capital illiquidity lead to underinvestment, conservative debt use, under-consumption, and less risky portfolio allocation. The endogenous liquid...

The interest rate is a key determinant of firm investment. We integrate a widely used term structure model of interest rates, CIR (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)), with the q theory of investment (Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994)). We show that stochastic interest rates have...

We propose a model of sovereign debt where countries vary in their level of financial development, defined as the extent to which countries can hedge rare disasters in international capital markets. We show that low levels of financial development generate the "debt intolerance" phenomenon that...

We estimate a model of damage to corporate earnings from COVID-19. An unexpected pandemic lowers current earnings due to costly mitigation and reduces growth rates. Damage depends on the expected arrival of a vaccine that reverts earnings to normal. Using this model, we infer from analysts'...

We study the corporate finance implications of risky inalienable human capital for a risk-averse entrepreneur. We show how liquidity and risk management policies coordinate investment and executive compensation policies to efficiently retain managerial talent and honor corporate liabilities. The...

We develop a model of investment timing under uncertainty for a financially constrained firm. Facing external financing costs, the firm prefers to fund its investment through internal funds, so that the firm's optimal investment policy and value depend on both its earnings fundamentals and...

We investigate whether the performance of Private Equity (PE) investments is sufficient to compensate investors (LPs) for risk, long-term illiquidity, management and incentive fees charged by the general partner (GP). We analyze the LP's portfolio-choice problem and find that management fees,...

Hedge fund managers are compensated via management fees on the assets under management (AUM) and incentive fees indexed to the high-water mark (HWM). We study the effects of managerial skills (alpha) and compensation on dynamic leverage choices and the valuation of fees and investors' payoffs....

We develop a q theory of investment with endogenous leverage, payout, hedging, and risk-taking dynamics. The key frictions are costly equity issuance and incomplete markets. We show that the marginal source of external financing on an on-going basis is debt. The firm lowers its debt when making...