We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when...

The deposit business differs at large versus small banks. We provide a parsimonious model and extensive empirical evidence supporting the idea that much of the variation in deposit-pricing behavior between large and small banks reflects differences in "preferences and technologies." Large banks...

Banks have voluntarily committed to align their lending portfolios with a net zero path toward a decarbonized economy. In this review, we explore the economic channels for why portfolio decarbonization might be consistent with lender profit maximization. We frame the question by positing that...

We assess the efficacy of systemic risk measures that rely on U.S. financial firms' stock return co-movements with market- or sector-wide returns under stress from 1927 to 2023. We ascertain stress episodes based on widening of corporate bond spreads and narrative dating. Systemic risk measures...

Swedish authorities and international organizations that comment on Swedish economic policy have argued that household debt is too high and a threat to financial and macroeconomic stability (FMS). But household debt may become a threat to FMS under essentially three conditions: (1) Household...

When race is not directly observed, regulators and analysts commonly predict it using algorithms based on last name and address. In small business lending--where regulators assess fair lending law compliance using the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) algorithm--we document large...

Bank liquid asset holdings vary significantly across banks and through time. The determinants of liquid asset holdings from the corporate finance literature are not useful to predict banks' liquid asset holdings. Banks have an investment motive to hold liquid assets, so that when their lending...

We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks' incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency...

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations during the Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract...