The financial crises of the last twenty years brought new economic concepts into classrooms discussions. This article introduces undergraduate students and teachers to seven of these models: (i) misallocation of capital inflows, (ii) modern and shadow banks, (iii) strategic complementarities and...

Greater reliance on nonbank financing makes firms fragile as it leads banks to limit their access to credit lines. Besides demonstrating this result in panel tests subject to range of controls and robustness checks, we employ the 2014-16 oil-price collapse as an exogenous rollover risk in...

We build a macroeconomic model that centers on liquidity transformation in the financial sector. Intermediaries maximize liquidity creation by issuing securities that are money-like in normal times but become illiquid in a crash when collateral is scarce. We call this process shadow banking. A...

This paper explores the relationship between different funding structures--including the source, instrument, currency, and counterparty location of funding--and the extent of financial stress experienced in different countries and sectors during the sharp risk-off shock in early 2020 when...

The rise of shadow banking and attendant financial fragility in China can be traced to intensified deposit competition following the global financial crisis (GFC). Deposit competition intensified after the GFC because the GFC slowed down banks' deposit growth from cross-border money inflows and...

Is bank capital structure designed to extract deposit subsidies? We address this question by studying capital structure decisions of shadow banks: intermediaries that provide banking services but are not funded by deposits. We assemble, for the first time, call report data for shadow banks which...

How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulation. Tighter capital requirements for regulated banks cause...

This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum...

We explain the emergence of a variety of intermediaries in a model based only on differences in their funding costs. Banks have a low cost of capital due to, say, safety nets or money-like liabilities. We show, however, that this can be a disadvantage, because it exacerbates...

This paper finds that banks and non-banks respond differently to increased competition in consumer credit markets. Increased competition and the greater threat of failure induces banks to specialize more in relationship business lending, and surviving banks are more profitable. However,...