This paper studies the optimal design of rules in a dynamic model when there is a time inconsistency problem and uncertainty about whether the policy maker can commit to follow the rule ex post. The policy maker can either be a commitment type, which can always commit to follow rules, or an...

Expectations of bailouts by central governments incentivize overborrowing by local governments. In this paper, we ask if fiscal rules can correct these incentives to overborrow when central governments cannot commit and if these rules will arise in equilibrium. We address these questions in a...

How should society allocate policy-making between the legislative and the executive branches of government? We analyze a model in which biased and polarized policymakers set policy in response to shocks. We show that policy issues for which the policy-maker bias is small relative to the degree...

This paper uses high frequency data to detect shifts in financial markets' perception of the Federal Reserve stance on inflation. We construct daily revisions to expectations of future nominal interest rates and inflation that are priced into nominal and inflation-protected bonds, and find that...

We develop a simple dynamic economic model of epidemic transmission designed to be consistent with widely used SIR biological models of the transmission of epidemics, while incorporating economic benefits and costs as well. Our main finding is that targeted testing and isolation policies deliver...

We study an economy in which consumers and merchants (sellers) interact on a two-sided platform. Consumers can share data about their tastes for different varieties of a single good with the platform which in turn sells this data to merchants. Data sharing increases gains from trade by improving...

The US government is the dominant supplier of global safe assets and faces a downward-sloping demand for its debt. In this paper, we ask if the US exercises its market power when issuing debt and study its macroeconomic consequences. We develop a model of the global economy in which US public...

The epidemiological literature suggests that virus transmission occurs only when individuals are in relatively close contact. We show that if society can control the extent to which economic agents are exposed to the virus and agents can commit to contracts, virus externalities are local, and...

We document the decline in market power of the U.K. in safe assets and quantify the resulting losses. We estimate an increasing elasticity of demand for U.K. public debt during the latter half of the 20th century. This is in sharp contrast to the U.S., which displays the opposite pattern with...

We study the extent to which the perceived cost of losing the exorbitant privilege the US holds in global safe asset markets sustains the safety of its public debt. Our findings indicate that the loss of this special status in the event of a default significantly augments the debt capacity for...