We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...

This study analyzes and contrasts the U.S. and EU antitrust standards on bundling (in its various forms) and tying. The analysis is applied to the U.S. and EU cases concerning Microsoft's practice of integrating (tying) new products (Internet Explorer in the U.S. and Windows Media Player in the...

We examine the intersection of patents and antitrust where a patent holder uses the monopoly power it possesses in the market for a patented product to exclude competitors in an adjacent market and attempt to monopolize or monopolize the adjacent market. The present scheme for awarding patents...

This paper proposes methods for identifying indirect network effects with dynamically optimizing consumers purchasing a durable hardware good and associated software. We apply this model to a data drawn from the DVD player and titles markets. We observe model-level prices, sales and...

We analyse competition between perfectly substitutable networks. Monopolization can be sustained in equilibrium by asymmetric access prices whereby entry is deterred by a set of margin squeezes. A regulatory package consisting of (i) mandatory interconnection; (ii) reciprocal access prices;...

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome may prevail independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A lighthanded regulatory policy can...

We analyze the linking and versioning strategies of a media firm when facing competition from blogs, search engines and news aggregators. First, we show that when the publisher competes against a blog it is less likely to release a fighting version if this generates signi ficant spillovers for...

We study optimal cartel prices in a two-sided market. We present a simple model showing that prices above the two-sided monopoly price may prevail on one side of a two-sided market as a means to enhance the sustainability of the cartel. We prove that in such a case a higher benefit from the...

Understanding the process of software adoption is of paramount importance to software start-ups. We study a monopolistic seller's optimal consumer network structure formation (seeding, segmentation, sequencing, and pricing strategies) under network effects. We demonstrate the importance of...

Platforms often use fee discrimination within their marketplace (e.g., Amazon, eBay, and Uber specify a variety of merchant fees). To better understand the impact of marketplace fee discrimination, we develop a model that allows us to determine equilibrium fee and category decisions that depend...