We model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries, their actions at each date produceemissions of greenhouse gases, and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases. The theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise....

We study the relationship between rationality and economic survival in a simple dynamic model, where agents from different populations interact repeatedly through random matching. An explicit criterion (quot;bankruptcyquot;) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are...

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of petty corruption by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic...

A modern firm often employs multiple production technologies based on distinct engineering principles, causing non-convexities in the firm s unit cost as a function of product quality. Extending the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), this paper investigates how a monopolist s productline design...