Showing 1 - 8 of 8
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between innovation and firms governancestructure. We present and analyze a simple model in which the firm s governance struc-ture influences the behavior of innovative employees and, in turn, innovation bringsabout changes to the firm s governance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012751191
We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product butmust hire employees to bring the product to the market. Information leakage implies that newly hired employees become informed of the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769261
We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of information leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information about the idea before and after the idea is implemented. We analyze the effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within firms and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755040
This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of investment in Ramp;D of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and quot;in-housequot; production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750079
This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of Ramp;D investment of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and in-house production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s technology and can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750087
We analyze the link between industry size and Ramp;D spending distribution. We consider amonopolistically competitive market in which firms can invest in cost-cutting Ramp;D by paying a fixed cost first. For an intermediate level of fixed cost, there is a unique equilibrium in which the market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012751266
We examine how the structure of terror networks varies with legal limits on interrogation and the ability of authorities to extract information from detainees. We assume that terrorist networks are designed to respond optimally to a trade-off caused by information exchange: Diffusing information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769870
In criminal organizations, diffusing information widely throughout the organization might lead to greater internal efficiency (in particular, since these organizations are self-sustaining, through facilitating cooperation). However, this may come at a cost of leaving the organization more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012766097