We study the design of interventions to stabilize financial markets plagued by adverse selection. Our contribution is to analyze the information revealed by participation decisions. Taking part in a government program carries a stigma, and outside options are mechanism-dependent. We show that...

Legal provisions that interfere with the arrest and prosecution of politicians exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why and with what effects do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically....

Legal provisions that interfere with the arrest and prosecution of politicians exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why and with what effects do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically....

Legal provisions that interfere with the arrest and prosecution of politicians exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why and with what effects do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically....

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically different from in a one-shot game. Our...

A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries, who also have privileged information about buyers’ valuations. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying the object and reselling it–the merchant model–or refer buyers to the seller and...

This note characterizes revenue maximizing auctions in a single unit independentprivate value environment when buyers distributions of valuations can be discrete, continuous, or any mixture of the two possibilities. The procedure described is applicable to many other single or multi- agent...

This paper studies revenue maximizing auctions when buyersiacute;outside options depend on their private information. The set-up is very general and encompasses a large number of potential applications. The main novel message of our analysis is that with type-dependent non-participation...

This paper studies revenue-maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple goods where the buyeriacute;s utility can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that despite strictly increasing virtual utilities, the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization may fail to be increasing...

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell herobject(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyersiacute;valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him, but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The...