We test the hypothesis that corporate managers leave their jobs less often when they receive stock-based compensation. In a sample of CEOs from 452 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991, we find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount of stock option...

An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by taking into account banks unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two...

The recent consolidation in the banking system has focused attention on the difference in lending between large and small banks, since large banks lend proportionally less to small business. We use a newly available survey of small business finances conducted by the Federal Reserve System to...