Entry Models such as Bresnahan and Reiss(91)[4] can under estimate the effect of competition. If the profitability of marketsis mismeasured, this introduces an positive correlation between unoberserved profitability and the number of firms in a market. Using data on entry and exit patterns in...

Fluctuations in demand cause some plants to exit a market and other to enter.Would eliminating these fluctuations reduce plant turnover? A structural model of entry and exit in concentrated markets is estimatedfor the ready-mix concrete industry, using plant level data from the U.S. Census. The...

In the late 1990s, the Canadian newspaper industry underwent rapid consolidation with a few conglomerates controlling the vast majority of daily papers. Over a 4 year period, about three-fourths of Canada s daily newspapers changed ownership. While the issue re-ceived considerable attention and...

This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of investment in Ramp;D of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and quot;in-housequot; production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s...

This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of Ramp;D investment of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and in-house production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s technology and can...

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between innovation and firms governancestructure. We present and analyze a simple model in which the firm s governance struc-ture influences the behavior of innovative employees and, in turn, innovation bringsabout changes to the firm s governance...

We analyze the link between industry size and Ramp;D spending distribution. We consider amonopolistically competitive market in which firms can invest in cost-cutting Ramp;D by paying a fixed cost first. For an intermediate level of fixed cost, there is a unique equilibrium in which the market...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product butmust hire employees to bring the product to the market. Information leakage implies that newly hired employees become informed of the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We...

We examine how the structure of terror networks varies with legal limits on interrogation and the ability of authorities to extract information from detainees. We assume that terrorist networks are designed to respond optimally to a trade-off caused by information exchange: Diffusing information...

We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of information leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information about the idea before and after the idea is implemented. We analyze the effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within firms and the...