We examine how the banking sector may ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, given lack of observability of effort, loan officers (or risk takers) are compensated based on the volume of loans but are penalized if banks suffer a high...

We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when, (i) surplus banks providingliquidity have market power, ii) there are frictions in the lendingmarket due to moral hazard, and, (iii) assets are bank-specific. We show that when the outside...

We study the liquidity demand of large settlement banks in the UK and its effect on the Sterling Money Markets before and during the sub-prime crisis of 2007-08. We document that liquidity holdings of the large settlement banks in the UK experienced on average a 30% increase in the period...

What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be...

We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage downward future...

We study the liquidity demand of large settlement banks in the UK and its effect on the Sterling Money Markets before and during the sub-prime crisis of 2007-08. Liquidity holdings of large settlement banks experienced on average a 30% increase in the period immediately following 9th August,...

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When...

We consider the release of information by a firm when the manager has discretion regarding the timing of its release. While it is well known that firms appear to delay the release of bad news, we examine how external information about the state of the economy (or the industry) affects this...

We develop a model for pricing risky debt and valuing credit derivatives that is easily calibrated to existing variables. Our approach is based on expanding the Das and Sundaram (2000) extension of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1990) term-structure model to allow for multiple ratings classes of debt....

We develop a model for pricing risky debt and valuing credit derivatives that is easily calibrated to existing variables. Our approach is based on expanding the Das and Sundaram (2000) extension of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1990) term-structure model to allow for multiple ratings classes of debt....