Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

Why don't successful venture capitalists eliminate excess demand for their follow-on funds by aggressively raising their performance fees? We propose a theory of learning that leads to informational hold-up in the VC market. Investors in a fund learn whether the VC has skill or was lucky,...

We examine whether networks among incumbent venture capital firms help restrict entryinto local VC markets in the U.S., thus improving VCs bargaining power over entrepreneurs. We show that VC markets with more extensive networking among the incumbent players experience less entry. The effect is...

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...