Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensivesample...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer s investment-banking relationships with...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer s investment-banking relationships with...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,456 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer s investment-banking relationships with...

We document widespread ex post changes to the historical contents of the I/B/E/S analyst stock recommendations database. Across a sequence of seven downloads of the entire I/B/E/S recommendations database, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 6,594 (1.6%) and 97,579 (21.7%) of...

We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments ofissuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank s chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural...

We investigate the empirical puzzle why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressiveassessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and...

We document how gathering ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information helps boards of directors to learn a CEO’s ability over time; test under what circumstances boards fire CEOs; and show that such interventions lead to improved firm performance. Our empirical design exploits detailed hard...

We document sizeable and surprising differences in investment behavior between stock market listed and privately held firms in the U.S. using a rich new data source on private firms. Listed firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities compared to...

We analyze the determinants of buyout funds' investment decisions. We argue that when the supply of capital is lsquo;sticky' in the short run, the timing of funds' investment decisions, their risk-taking behavior, and their subsequent returns depend on changes in the demand for private equity,...