We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by...

Using data from the Wisconsin Entrepreneurial Climate Study, we study the sources of firms' finance during the very early stages of their lives. Our focus is the evolution of the mix of financial capital from 'insiders' and 'outsiders' as firms age. We find that at the beginning of firms' life...

This paper investigates the distribution of equity ownership between entrenched corporate insiders and dispersed outsiders when management has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows and when it is costly for equity holders to verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing for a third...

This paper develops a theory of mergers and divestitures wherein the motivation for mergers stems from the inability to finance marginally profitable, possibly short-horizon projects as stand-alone entities due to agency problems between managers and potential claimholders. A conglomerate merger...

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms...

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging marketeconomies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the...

Abstract This paper focuses on the dynamic capital structure of firms: Why firms choose very different capital structure in different stages of their life-cycles? In a model of optimal financial contracting, we investigate whether subsequent financing decisions of firms are affected by the...

This paper presents a theory of outside equity based on the control rights and the maturity design of equity. We show that outside equity is a tacit agreement between investors and management supported by equityholders right to dismiss management regardless of performance and by the lack of a...

This paper investigates the design of the control rights and the maturity of securities when management has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows, and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party, such as court, to verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing. By endogenizing...