We construct a model of counter-cyclical markups based on cyclical variation inthe dispersion of income across agents. The model is neoclassical in most respects, with monopolistically competitive firms facing a distribution of buyers that changes through time. Income dispersion is high during...

This paper presents a model of information quality and political regime change. If enough citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard. The...

This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population canoverthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibriumand in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly...

This paper develops a method for solving for the dynamic general equilibrium of a deterministic continuous time overlapping generations model with a finite-horizon life-cycle. The model has isoelastic preferences and allows for general assumptions about individual endowments and demographics....