This paper analyses the political constraints of intergenerational risk sharing. The first result is that the political process generally does not lead to ex ante optimal insurance. The second result is that in a second best political setting PAYG still contributes to intergenerational risk...

Using a model of a two-pillar pension system, designed after and calibrated to the Dutch situation, we explore for the funding ratio of pension funds and the welfare of individuals the implications of replacing nominal debt in the pension fund's portfolio with indexed debt. We consider...

This paper explores the introduction of collective risk-sharing elements in defined contribution pension contracts. We consider status-contingent, age-contingent and asset contingent risk-sharing arrangements. All arrangements raise aggregate welfare, as measured by equivalent variations. While...

We explore the implications of alternative methods of discounting future pension outlays for the valuation of funded pension liabilities. Measured liabilities affect the asset-liability ratio of pension funds and, thereby, their policies. Our framework for analysis is an applied many-generation...

We develop a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations to show that Social Security may increase welfare in dynamically efficient economies where agents are affected by self-control problems a la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, Econometrica 69, 1403). In calibrating the model to the US...

Using the reform on unemployment benefit II system in 2005 in Germany this paper verifies precautionary saving motives of German households. Based on first difference and random effects Tobit model using two years of GSOEP panel data, this paper found an increase in benefit amount by one unit...

Funded social security programs are particularly vulnerable to economic and financial market shocks. As a consequence of the recent crisis, a large fraction of the Dutch pension funds had to submit restoration plans for the recovery of their buffers. Such plans will have to rely primarily on a...

We analyze the political stability of welfare enhancing privatization of the social security. We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations, who vote on abolishing the funded system and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. "unprivatizing" the pension system. We show...

Under which conditions do vote-seeking governments pursue reforms in welfare programs that are unpopular among the median voter and that, consequently, likely lead to a loss of votes? This paper proposes reforms may result from a commitment problem of voters between elections. Due to economic...

In this paper we analyze the consequences of pension funding in a general equilibrium model of both formal schooling decisions and on-the-job human capital formation à la Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). Our focus lies on the distortive and redistributive effects of a Bismarckian pension...