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When fiction Trumps truth : what "post-truth" and "alternative facts" mean for management studies
Knight, Eric; Tsukas, Charidēmos K. - In: Organization studies : an international … 40 (2019) 2, pp. 183-197
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980970
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The never-ending story : discursive legitimation in social media dialogue
Glozer, Sarah; Caruana, Robert; Hibbert, Sally A. - In: Organization studies : an international … 40 (2019) 5, pp. 625-650
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010333
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Knots in the discourse of innovation : investigating multiple tensions in a reacquired spin-off
Sheep, Mathew L.; Fairhurst, Gail Theus; Khazanchi, Shalini - In: Organization studies : an international … 38 (2017) 3/4, pp. 463-488
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771367
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Artful legitimacy : the role of materiality in practices of legitimation
Cnossen, Boukje; Bencherki, Nicolas - In: Organization studies : an international … 44 (2023) 6, pp. 919-938
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014295231
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Communication and influence
Prat, Andrea; de Martí, Joan; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full … that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019200
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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
Zhang, Wenzhang; Chan, Jimmy H. - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)
-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, so long as the players can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093701
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549
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Communication and influence
Prat, Andrea; de Martí, Joan; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 649-690
invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full … that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599550
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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
Zhang, Wenzhang; Chan, Jimmy H. - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 53-87
-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, so long as the players can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599563