In the marriage problems (two-sided one-to-one matching problems), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are the core concepts...

This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...

This paper studies allocation correspondences in the house allocation problems with collective initial endowments. We examine the implications of two axioms, namely quot;consistencyquot; and quot;unanimity.quot; Consistency requires the allocation correspondence be invariant under reductions of...

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sonmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...