The paper illustrates the results of some experiments aiming to test the effect of taxation on the effort. Differently from previous experiments (Levy-Garboua et al., Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, Swenson), in our research the revenue of taxation is not depleted but employed, more realistically, to...

The experiment presented in this paper has two aims, both methodological. First, we want to check for the role of what we may call (after Carpenter et al., 2006) the they came to play effect. Second, we want to test whether the lab outcomes are confirmed by a questionnaire on a hypothetical...

La ricerca si propone di verificare l'universalità dei risultati (e quindi della teoria che li suffraga) di un piccolo ma altamente considerato corpus sperimentale, in base al quale l'erogazione dello sforzo lavorativo e' influenzata negativamente dall'imposizione fiscale. Tale...

It is argued that the propensity to cooperate may be negatively affected by competition. Experimental evidence support this hypothesis. In a set of three experiments in which different degrees of competition characterize the markets, participants reduce their contributions to a public project as...

The aim of this paper is to improve on the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) by developing a non-linear model (that leads to interior rather than corner solutions) and by taking into account that different levels of income imply different reactions of fair-minded people. We suggest to modify the...

What do indices of disproportionality actually measure? They provide an aggregate estimation of the difference between votes cast and seats assignment, but the relation between the value of the indices and the will of the voters is highly questionable. The reason is that when casting the vote...

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the electoral rules in Italy. In particular, we simulate some voting rules to test what is the best electoral system on the basis of a utility function that takes into account two indices: representativeness and governability. As long as...

The model by Fehr and Schmidt introduces envy and altruism in the utility function of a representative agent. The aim of this paper is to provide two extensions - non linearity and non self-centredness - to this model. This extension turns out to be more consistent with experimental evidence...

This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate introduction of a second potential punisher is neither...