The FCC was an innovator in adopting the rules of the simultaneous ascending-price auction for its sales of spectrum licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design improvements suggested in our first report), there...

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of...

We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on...

The present invention primarily concerns hybrid auctions that may, for example, combine a clock auction with a proxy auction. Hybrid auctions include multi-item auctions that comprise at least two phases of package auctions: an earlier phase in which bidders participate in a clock auction (or...

The present invention primarily concerns hybrid auctions that may, for example, combine a clock auction with a proxy auction. Hybrid auctions include multi-item auctions that comprise at least two phases of package auctions: an earlier phase in which bidders participate in a clock auction (or...

The present invention is a system and method to sell or procure complementary goods. A complementary good according to the invention is a good whose value or utility is enhanced when paired with another good, such a pair of goods is a communications license to encumbered spectrum and a...

We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear...

ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by allowing reserve availability bids in the...

During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its...

This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key...