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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2012

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278326

The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2005

an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789506

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment

Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2007

behavior of juniors (under 30) and seniors (over 50) in both experiments conducted onsite with the employees of two large firms … external validity of conventional laboratory experiments. In general we do not find strong differences in behavior between … workers and non-workers, indicating that laboratory experiments may not be such a bad approximation for the field environment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793278

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2011

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009220690

Respect and relational contracts

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2012

market context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422032

Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2010

environment and reports on an experiment based on a non-cooperative game in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647578

Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven; … - HAL - 2003

A demand for behavioral norms arises when members of a group have individual incentives to take actions that reduce the group's overall welfare (James S. Coleman, 1990). Norms require enforcement with a system of sanctions that penalize deviations from acceptable behavior (George C. Homans,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647584