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The people's hired guns? : experimentally testing the inclination of prosecutors to abuse the vague definition of crimes
Engel, Christoph; Pluta, Alicja - 2011
; prosecution ; doctrinal ambiguity ; vaguely defined crimes ; duty ; DOSPERT … signalling game and test it experimentally. If we have participants play the naked game, at least a minority plays the game …. Our experimental prosecutors behave like textbook legal idealists, and follow the urge of duty. -- Risk aversion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009161317
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Beware of broken windows! First impressions in public-good experiments
Beckenkamp, Martin; Engel, Christoph; Glöckner, Andreas; … - 2009
Broken Windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. In a series of lab experiments we show that first impressions are indeed causal for cooperativeness in three different institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267001
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Beware of broken windows! : first impressions in public-good experiments
Beckenkamp, Martin; Engel, Christoph; Glöckner, Andreas; … - 2009
Broken Windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. In a series of lab experiments we show that first impressions are indeed causal for cooperativeness in three different institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862429
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Deterrence by imperfect sanctions : a public good experiment
Engel, Christoph - 2013
) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742336
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Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on "Broken (and Fixed) Windows"
Engel, Christoph; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael - 2011
-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281841
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Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? : an experimental study on "Broken (and Fixed) Windows"
Engel, Christoph; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael - 2011
-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007141
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Punishment despite reasonable doubt: A public goods experiment with uncertainty over contributions
Grechenig, Kristoffel; Nicklisch, Andreas; Thöni, Christian - 2010
Under a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate, when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274085
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Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery
Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Yu, Gaoneng - 2012
In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286689
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On probation : an experimental analysis
Engel, Christoph; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2009
Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003905816
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Punishment despite reasonable doubt : a public goods experiment with uncertainty over contributions
Grechenig, Christoffel; Nicklisch, Andreas; Thöni, … - 2010
Under a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate, when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952402