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You are in charge: Experimentally testing the motivating power of holding a judicial office

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2016

Apparently judges' decisions are not motivated by maximizing their own profit. The literature uses two strategies to explain this observation: judges care about the long-term monetary consequences for themselves, or individuals who are more strongly motivated by the common good self-select into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580499

You are in charge : experimentally testing the motivating power of holding a judicial office

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2016

Apparently judges’ decisions are not motivated by maximizing their own profit. The literature uses two strategies to explain this observation: judges care about the long-term monetary consequences for themselves, or individuals who are more strongly motivated by the common good self-select...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553361

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226

Ex interim voting in public good provision

Fischer, Sven; Nicklisch, Andreas - 2006

We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is ¯nally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264801

Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information

Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca; … - 2014

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420309

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner's dilemma as a game of multiple motives

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013

Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323844

Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information

Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca; … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260115

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? : the prisoner's dilemma as a game of multiple motives

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2012 - revised version: August 2013

Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573481

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522109

Inherited institutions : cooperation in the light of democratic legitimacy

Langenbach, Pascal; Tausch, Franziska - 2017

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a … impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …) institution, as compared to the corresponding, randomly imposed setting. In the second generation, the procedural history only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587713