A policy will be used more heavily in a time and place where its cost is lower. The analyst who treats times and places as identical will overestimate the policy's net benefit, especially for policy intensities greater than exist in his sample. In regression analysis, the problem can be solved...

Legislators in modern democracies accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In the authors' model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the...

Politicians trade off the cost of acquiring and processing information against the benefit of being reelected. Lobbyists may possess private information upon which politicians would like to rely without the effort of verification. If the politician does not try to verify, however, the lobbyist...

Randolph Sloof (1997) has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signaling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium the author missed and criticizes the author's emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium. In this response, the author discusses how to interpret multiple...