Showing 1 - 7 of 7
This paper examines the reasons whycorruption and policy distortions tend toexhibit a high degree of persistence incertain regimes. We identify circumstancesunder which a firm seeks to evaderegulations through (i) bribery of localinspectors, and (ii) by lobbying high-levelgovernment politicians...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709152
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005004447
This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067921
The role of political institutions in shaping public policy has been analyzed in isolation from corruption, and legislative organization (specifically, bicameralism) has received minimal attention. We analyze pollution taxation when decisions are influenced by several veto players, such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005705662
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005705850
The literature suggests that democracy positively affects environmental policy stringency. Using the method of propensity score matching, we find that this result appears to be largely driven by the parliamentary democracies (as opposed to the presidential-congressional, proportional or majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674777
This paper develops a positive theory of pollution taxation by a federal authority when pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental and industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, pollution may increase in the pollution tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674963