Accounting for sample selection is a challenge not only for empirical researchers, but also for the agents populating our models. Yet most models abstract from these issues and assume that agents successfully tackle selection problems. We design an experiment where a person who understands...

In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history-dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects...

We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender–one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...

In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history‐dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects...