A regulatory incentive mechanism is presented in which the regulated firm has superior information about both cost and demand, compared to the regulator. The mechanism leads to truthful revelation of the demand function and extracts all rents due to private demand information in a nondistorting...

We examine profit-maximizing nonlinear pricing under a stylized version of the FCC's price-cap plan for AT&T, whereby the firm's average revenue in each period is constrained not to exceed some fixed level. When average revenue in each period is calculated as the ratio of total revenue in that...

We analyze optimal multiproduct nonlinear prices in the case where consumer tastes are characterized by more than one taste parameter. We present conditions under which the optimal nonlinear price schedule can be computed by finding optimal price schedules separately for each market. If so, they...

We characterize the optimal procurement contract in a setting where a supplier has privileged knowledge of the quality of a public signal about his production costs. The optimal contract exhibits important differences with standard contracts in adverse selection settings. For instance, the...