This article develops a general econometric procedure for determining the amount of rent captured by buyers and sellers of goods produced under any market structure. We use this technique to measure the rents earned by firms involved in the extraction, transportation, and consumption of...

We consider a professional sports league's use of a well-defined incentive mechanism, revenue sharing, to encourage the desired behavior of teams in the league. The incentive mechanism works by internalizing externalities that arise across agents (the team owners). We find revenue sharing to be...

Multimarket contact between duopolists in an X and Y market is modelled with a trigger strategy. We show that mildly restrictive price-cap regulation in the X market decreases Y market quantities; but restrictive caps in the X market have a positive impact on Y market outputs. Behavior in...

We conduct economic experiments to gauge the level of cooperation between conglomerate rivals. First we run control experiments to observe cooperation between subjects acting as duopolists in one of two markets. In the control experiments, subject pairs choose a quantity xi (or yi) from a payoff...