Industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor. During the evolution of most industries, however, a sequence of firms enters (or attempts to enter) at distinct points in time....

Traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internal features such as demand conditions, concentration, and barriers-to-entry. Nevertheless, some economists have remained concerned that external factors, such as contact across...

In a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents. In this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperatively select agents, name output prices, and choose compensation schemes. We...

The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two agents produces a different input and contracts directly with the principal), and delegation (two...

I investigate the issue of endogenous spillover of R&D information across firms through information exchange between their employees. Although the firms typically cannot observe and restrict communication between their employees in a direct way, they can regulate information flows through the...