We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research, we emphasize control-rights considerations, and argue that the...

In a dynamic model of asymmetric information between the owner of a firm and a manager, we investigate the optimal set of contingencies on which an incentive contract should depend when renegotiation is possible. In particular, we characterize the circumstances in which the contracting parties...

This article reviews the recent literature on regulation under asymmetric information. We first develop the conceptual framework and offer a reminder of the techniques used in the field. Then we apply the framework and techniques to a variety of situations -- with or without commitment. We...

We develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environment. Networks pay (negotiated or regulated) access charges to each other and compete in prices for customers. We show that a...

Our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks, under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing. This article relaxes this assumption and allows...

We analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long-distance carriers. We first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and has access to an additional technology (bypass) more efficient for large customers....

We develop a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. We analyze the impact of the access charge on competitive...

A supplier is known to be subject to opportunism when contracting secretly with downstream competitors, particularly when downstream firms have "passive beliefs.'' We stress that in many situations, an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist and passive beliefs appear less plausible than...

This article shows how vertical restraints, which affect intrabrand competition, can and will be used for reducing interbrand competition. Exclusive territories alter the perceived demand curve, making each producer believe he faces a less elastic demand curve, inducing an increase in the...