We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims in the context of a variable population. A property of rules is "lifted" if whenever a rule satisfies it in the two-claimant case, and the rule is bilaterally consistent, it satisfies it for any number of claimants. We identify a number...

We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, and characterize the family of rules satisfying four standard invariance requirements, homogeneity, two composition properties, and consistency. It takes as point of departure the characterization of the family of two-claimant rules...

We identify previously unnoticed ways in which agents can strategically distort allocation rules, by affecting the set of “active” agents. (i) An agent withdraws with his endowment. (ii) He gives control of his endowment to someone else and withdraws. (iii) He invites someone in and let him...

We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by augmenting his endowment through borrowing resources from the outside world (alternatively, by simply exaggerating it). We show that the Walrasian rule is not "borrowing-proof" even on...

This essay surveys the literature on the axiomatic model of bargaining formulated by Nash ("The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 28, 1950, 155-162).

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a bundle of infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents with "classical" preferences. We propose to measure an agent's "sacrifice" at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption. As a...