We investigate conditions that amplify market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that ‘small’ market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent...

Suggestions on international cooperation in climate policy beyond 2012 include substituting or complementing international environmental agreements (IEA) with technology-oriented agreements (TOA). We look at the impact of TOA on environmental cooperation in a framework of coalition stability....

This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare and energy prices in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. The imperfectness of the carbon price is motivated by political concerns regarding...

Strategic market behavior by permit sellers will harm the European Union (EU) as it is expected to become a large net buyer of permits in a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. In this paper, we explore how the EU could benefit from making permit trade agreements with non-EU countries....

Uncertainty and learning play an important role in the management of many environmental and resource problems and in particular in climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, learning...

Stabilizing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at levels expected to prevent dangerous climate changes has become an important, long-term global objective. It is therefore crucial to identify a cost-effective way to achieve this objective. In this paper, we use WITCH, a...