This paper introduces asymmetric information into a competitive asset market in a dynamic general-equilibrium model with borrowing constraints. In the presence of borrowing constraints, asset sales become a crucial means for agents to finance opportunities to invest in new assets. In this...

In this paper I analyze the effects of innovations in information technology on the mortgage and housing markets using a life-cycle model with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic income, as well as moving and house price shocks. I explicitly model the housing tenure choices of households....

This paper studies the relationship between the availability of unsecured credit to households and unemployment. We extend the Mortensen-Pissarides model to include a goods market with search and financial frictions. Households, who have limited commitment, face endogenous borrowing constraints...

When faced with a speculative attack, banks and governments often hesitate, attempting to withstand the attack but giving up after some time, suggesting they have some ex-ante uncertainty about the attack they will face. I model that uncertainty as arising from incomplete information about...

We study the problem of a firm that faces asymmetric information about the persistent productivity of its potential workers. In our framework, a worker's productivity is either assigned by nature at birth, or determined by an unobservable initial action of the worker that has persistent effects...

We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and effort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have secret access to the credit market or to storage. The recursive structure is based on a generalized first order approach, whose validity...

This paper employs a dynamic general equilibrium model to design and evaluate long-term unemployment insurance plans (plans that depend on workers' unemployment history) in economies with and without hidden savings. We show that optimal benefit schemes and welfare implications differ...

In a multiple-good risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which collateralized debt is the optimal contract. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the...

This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of asymmetric information, where non-exclusive contracts are traded on competitive markets and agents may be privately informed over their payoff. For such economies competitive equilibria may not exist when...

This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context...