In DSGE models, fiscal policy is typically described by simple rules in which tax rates respond to the level of output. We show that there is only weak empirical evidence in favor of such specifications in U.S. data. Instead, the cyclical movements of labor and capital income tax rates are...

A political-economic theory of fiscal policy is presented in which tax policy preferences are derived from a conflict of interest between individuals of different ages. Policy formation is fully rational in that an individual's beliefs regarding future policies are consistent with...

This paper analyzes the effects of intergenerational conflict on capital and labor income tax rates, transfers, and government spending in a model of multidimensional policy choice. The different nature of tax liabilities for the young and the old can explain why the old receive large gross...

This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality for the comovement of government purchases with macroeconomic fluctuations. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model, where households value government purchases which are financed by income...

This paper evaluates the extent to which a DSGE model can account for the impact of tax policy shocks. We estimate the response of macroeconomic aggregates to anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks in the U.S. and find that unanticipated tax cuts have persistent expansionary effects on output,...

This paper studies the effects of asymmetries in re-election probabilities across parties on public policy and their subsequent propagation to the economy. The struggle between groups that disagree on targeted public spending (e.g., pork) results in governments being endogenously short-sighted:...

This paper studies the optimal management of the maturity of government debt in an economy without commitment. We consider a reputation where any deviation triggers reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium. We obtain two results. First, contrary to earlier literature, we show that a very...

In this paper we study optimal taxation in a dynamic game played by a sequence of governments and a private sector composed of a continuum of households. We focus on the Markov-perfect equilibrium of this game under two different assumptions on the extent of government's intra-period commitment,...

This paper characterizes the time-consistency properties of the set of Pareto efficient (or second best) fiscal policies, in a two-class, stochastic economy similar to that in Judd (1985). The key finding is that the continuation of any Pareto efficient policy is always Pareto efficient. Hence,...

We consider a dynamic moral hazard economy inhabited by a planner and a population of privately informed agents. We assume that the planner and the agents share the same discount factor, but that the planner cannot commit. We show that optimal allocations in such settings solve the problems of...