We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with "changing tastes". we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. building on an example given by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R8">Peleg and Yaari (1973)</xref>, we show that for problems with...

We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is" compulsive "if it differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good is" addictive "if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. We analyse the welfare...

We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with "changing tastes". We provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. Building on an example given by Peleg and Yaari (1973), we show that for problems with...

We analyse political contests (campaigns) between two parties with opposing interests. Parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit. Parties' actions are strategic substitutes: increasing one party's cost...

We construct an infinite horizon model of harmful addiction. Consumption is compulsive if it differs from what the individual would have chosen had commitment been available. A good is addictive if its consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good. We analyse the welfare...