This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under "asymmetric" information and proceeds then to derive an "Equivalence Principle" between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an...

This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization...

This paper examines the role of the information contained in stock prices in the regulation of privatized firms. Stock prices contain noisy but unbiased information about firm's future prospects that regulators can use to decide on some regulatory policies. The main argument developed is that...

We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable...

We propose a model of costly decision making based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision-maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time, and lets the decision maker 'think ahead' about future decision problems in yet...

This paper examines the role of the information contained in stock prices in the regulation of privatized firms. Stock prices contain noisy but unbiased information about firm's future prospects that regulators can use to decide on some regulatory policies. The main argument developed is that...

The dynamics of regulation is analysed in a model where regulatory capture comes from the repeated interaction between an interest group and a regulatory agency. Regulatory institutions offer a framework for this dynamic process. They put constraints on the interest group's influence. The...

This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm andthe growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in whichmonopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers insidethe organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate...

I develop a dynamic political economy theory of optimal taxation and budget distortions in a model with partisan politics. Under asymmetric information, politics affects the distribution of utilities in the economy. Political regime switching introduces fluctuations of this distribution. These...