We analyse information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain pay-offs that are correlated across players. Players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players. We give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,...

We analyse information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain pay-offs that are correlated across players. Players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players. We give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,...

A basic problem facing most labour markets is that workers can neither commit to long-term wage contracts nor can they self-finance the costs of production. I study the effects of these imperfections when talent is industry-specific; it can only be revealed on the job, and once learnt becomes...

A basic problem facing most labour markets is that workers can neither commit to long-term wage contracts nor can they self-finance the costs of production. I study the effects of these imperfections when talent is industry-specific; it can only be revealed on the job, and once learnt becomes...