Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Are politicians motivated by policy outcomes or by the perks of office? To shed light on this important question, I develop a simple model of two candidate electoral competitions in which candidates may be either "office" or "policy motivated". In a second departure from standard formulations,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005167893
In this paper I show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1. These bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate. Significantly, in this equilibrium the pivot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242750
Are politicians motivated by policy outcomes or by the perks of office? To shed light on this important question, I develop a simple model of two candidate electoral competitions in which candidates may be either office or policy motivated. In a second departure from standard formulations, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010637932
In this paper I show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1. These bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate. Significantly, in this equilibrium the pivot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010638047
We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970129
This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970131
This paper analyses a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal their private information. Bluffing (respectively sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970178
We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005312795
This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition-measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms-evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005161438
Another issue related to bidding strategy is whether to be bold or cautious in opening bidding. The man who strongly desires an item will jump in with both feet, as it were, or try to rout the enemy by starting out with a high, possibly loud, bid intended to "knock out" his opponents. Sometimes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672988