When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions, and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality in utility and consumption is inevitable in any steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in investments. However,...

Learning-by-doing and increasing returns are often perceived to have similar implications for market structure and conduct. The authors analyze this in the context of an infinite-horizon, price-setting game. Learning is shown to not reduce the viability of market-sharing collusion between a...

When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions, and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality "in utility and consumption" is inevitable in "any" steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in investments. However,...

We study informal insurance within communities, explicitly recognizing the possibility that subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group. We therefore consider self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements that are robust not only to single-person deviations...

Relative to developed countries and some parts of the developing world, most notably sub-Saharan Africa, there are far fewer women than men in India and China. It has been argued that as many as a 100 million women could be missing. The possibility of gender bias at birth and the mistreatment of...

We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function...

We study informal insurance within communities, explicitly recognizing the possibility that subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group. We therefore consider self--enforcing risk--sharing agreements that are robust not only to single--person deviations...

The authors consider the properties of equilibrium behavior in an aggregative growth model with intergenerational altruism. Various positive properties such as the cyclicity of equilibrium programs and the convergence of equilibrium stocks to a steady state, are analyzed. Among other normative...

The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is...

We study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing. Players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other's past actions; they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship. There is...