We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian, non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, on which the...

We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may...

"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint PaulWhat behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? In earlier work, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R8">Gul and Pesendorfer...</xref>

We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib15">Grossman and Hart (1980)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib17">Harris and Raviv (1988)</xref>, and Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989). We consider three...

"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul Copyright Copyright © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

We endogenize preferences using the "indirect evolutionary approach". Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may...

We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian, non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, on which the...

This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. The authors obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's...