Despite familiar arguments for diversification, many investors choose to hold significant blocks of equity in the same firm. While control benefits may explain majority blocks, most blocks are much smaller. This paper develops a theory whereby such blocks can confer to their holders partial...

The authors present a new methodology for studying the problem of intrafirm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment. They develop and analyze a general noncooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its...

Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. We analyse one regulatory...

Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. We analyse one regulatory...

This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with N strategic agents. Agents receive random stock endowments at each period and trade to share dividend risk. Endowments are the only private information in the model. The author finds that agents trade slowly even when the time between...

We propose a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized. Our model incorporates two features of many actual organizations: aggregation entails a loss of useful information, and the decision problems of different agents interact. We assume that an...

We develop a model of the gambler's fallacy--the mistaken belief that random sequences should exhibit systematic reversals. We show that an individual who holds this belief and observes a sequence of signals can exaggerate the magnitude of changes in an underlying state but underestimate their...

We propose a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized. Our model incorporates two features of many actual organizations: aggregation entails a loss of useful information, and the decision problems of different agents interact. We assume that an...