The present paper extends the Folk theorem in repeated games to the situation where agents change their partners over time. Cooperation is sustained because defection against one agent causes sanction by others, and the paper shows how such a "social norm" is sustained by self-interested agents....

The present paper tries to explain cooperative behavior in an organization run by a sequence of long- but finitely-lived agents. The author shows that the Folk theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely-lived players; any mutually beneficial outcome can...

The supergame-theoretic model of price competition (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) is reexamined in the case of serially correlate demand shocks. The equilibrium price is shown to exhibit the same counter-cyclical movement as the i.i.d. case if the discount factor and the number of firms satisfy a...

The present paper formalizes the idea that improved monitoring helps coordination in long-term relationships. Specifically, the pure-strategy sequential equilibrium payoff set is shown to expand (in the sense of set inclusion) in repeated games with imperfect monitoring when the quality of the...

The authors study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends A. Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and they use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory...

We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and efficiency are...